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orders@ntis.fedworld.gov Online ordering: http://www.ntis.gov/help/ordermethods.asp?loc=7-4-0#online Introduction Proposed exascale systems will present extreme fault tolerance challenges to applications and system software. In particular, these systems are expected to suffer soft or hard errors at least several times a day. Such errors include uncorrectable DRAM failures, I/O system failures, and CPU logic failures. Unfortunately, fault-tolerance methods currently in use by large-scale applications, such as roll-back recovery from a checkpoint, may be unsuitable to address the challenges of exascale computing. As a result, applications will need to address resilience challenges previously handled only by the hardware, OS, and run-time system if they want to utilize future systems efficiently. Unfortunately, few interfaces and mechanisms exist to provide applications with useful information on the faults and failures that affect them. This is particularly true of DRAM failures, one of the most common failures in current large-scale systems [18] , but for which only low-level models of failure and recovery currently exist.
In this paper, we describe work on a collaborative application / OS system to handle uncorrected memory errors. We begin by reviewing the basics of DRAM memory failures and how they are handled in current systems. We then discuss specific models of memory failures that we are examining for application design and system implementation purposes, how the application, OS, and hardware can interact under these failure models, and how applications recover in this scenario. Based on this, we then present a simple OS and hardware interface to provide the information to applications necessary to handle these errors, and we outline an implementation of this interface. We illustrate the use of this interface through its integration with a new fault-tolerant iterative linear solver implemented with components from the Trilinos solvers library [8] , and present initial convergence results showing the viability of this recovery approach. Finally, we discuss related and future work.
DRAM Failures
DRAM memory modules are one of the most plentiful hardware items in modern HPC systems. Each node may have dozens of DRAM chips, and large systems may have tens or hundreds of thousands of DRAM modules. The combination of the quantity and the density of the information they store makes them particularly susceptible to faults. As a result, most HPC systems include some built-in hardware fault tolerance for DRAM. The most common hardware memory resilience scheme has the CPU memory controller write additional checksum bits on each block of data written (128-bit blocks are used on modern AMD processors, for example). The controller uses these bits to detect and correct errors reading these blocks of data back into the CPU. Most modern codes use Single-symbol 1 Error Correction and Double-symbol Error Detection (SEC-DED) schemes, allowing them to recover from the simplest memory failures and at least detect more complex (and less frequent) ones.
Recent research has shown that uncorrectable errors (e.g., double-symbol errors) are increasingly common in systems with SEC-DED memory protection [18] , with uncorrectable DRAM errors occurring in up to 8% of DIMMs per year. Such errors result in a machine check exception being delivered to the operating system, which then generally logs the error and either kills the application or reboots the system depending upon the location of the error in memory. Some systems exist for recovering from such errors, for example in Linux when they occur in memory used for caching data or owned by a virtual machine [12] , but these systems are much too low-level to be useful to application developers.
Fault and Recovery Model Fault Model
Because of their frequency, which is only expected to increase in future systems, it is particularly important that applications be able to recover from DRAM memory failures that hardware schemes cannot correct. Because these failures can potentially destroy important application data, however, recovering from them can be challenging. To address this issue, we examine a specific model for memory failures that we believe is relevant to a range of applications, discuss the application, OS, and hardware requirements of providing this failure model, and discuss how applications can recover given this failure model. For application design purposes, the initial model of failures we explore in this work is of transient memory failures. In this model, applications designate portions of DRAM memory may occasionally return incorrect values, and these values are expected to revert to their original value in a finite amount of time. We believe that this is a useful model for initial designs of robust numerical algorithms, as it allows them to designate both essential memory and memory that need only be usually correct. We illustrate the usefulness of this model to a specific numeric algorithm later in this paper.
Because many DRAM memory errors are not in fact transient, the application, OS, and hardware can cooperate to map the the hardware-provided failure model to one of transient DRAM memory failures. Specifically, we use a combination of hardware-level memory error detection and either application or system-level checkpointing [6] can work together to provide the appearance of transient DRAM failures, assuming an underlying model of detected DRAM failures. This is particularly effective when the application and system rarely modify the data being protected. For example, iterative methods for solving linear systems Ax = b generally do not modify the matrix A and any preconditioner(s), which we exploit later in this work.
Recovery Model
To handle the failures discussed above, we present a recovery model oriented towards iterative numerical methods where the algorithm can continue to converge past faults that temporarily perturb its state. Because DRAM failures caused by reading corrupted memory can be signaled by the hardware both synchronously (due to an algorithm reading corrupted memory) and asynchronously (from the memory scrubber), we focus on a model in which the algorithm running at the time of a failure temporarily patches failures to allow progress to continue to be made and then fully recovers from the detected error later.
Specifically, our recovery model comprises the following steps:
1. The application designates to the operating and runtime system the portions of its memory in which it can tolerate a transient memory error. Errors in portions of memory not so designated are deemed fatal and cause application termination.
2. Upon receiving notification of an uncorrectable memory error in designated memory, the OS signals the application that an error has occurred at a specified address.
3. The application performs immediate but potentially partial fixes on the failed memory sufficient to allow the current calculation to continue, possibly with some degradation of accuracy. 4. The application records that an error has perturbed the current calculation, to prevent it from incorrectly succeeding and returning incorrect values (e.g., if the convergence metric has been corrupted).
5. The application resumes execution at the instruction that was executing when the failure was detected.
6. At a well-defined point (e.g., every few iterations), the system or application recovers the corrupted memory using, for example, an application-specific recovery technique or a local checkpoint.
7. The application records that corrupted values have been fixed, potentially allowing it to complete after an additional successful iteration.
Application / OS Interface Design
We have designed an application / OS interface to support the fault and recovery models described in Section , and implemented a library to provide this interface. Our key design /* Register callback for handling failure in specific allocation of * failable memory at a specified byte offset and length. arg is an * opaque user-supplied argument. */ typedef void (*memfail_callback_t)( void *allocation, size_t off, size_t len, void *arg); void memfail_recover_init( memfail_callback_t cb, void *arg ); /* Allocate resp. free failable memory */ void * malloc_failable( size_t len ); void free_failable( void *addr ); This application level of this interface, shown in Figure 1 , focuses on run-time memory allocation. In particular, the interface provides the application with separate calls for allocating failable memory-memory in which failures will cause notifications to be sent to the application. These calls work like malloc() and free(). In addition, the application also registers a callback with the library. The callback is called once for every active allocation when the library is notified by the OS of a detected but uncorrected memory fault in that allocation.
In addition to this interface, we also provide a simple producer-consumer bounded ring buffer that the application can use to queue up a sequence of failed allocations when signaled by the library. This ring buffer is non-blocking and atomic to allow asynchronous callbacks from the library to enqueue failed allocations that will be fully recovered at the end of an iteration. The application determines the size of this buffer when it is allocated; the number of entries needed must be sufficient to cover all of the allocations that could plausibly fail during a single iteration. For applications with relatively few failable allocations, this should be a minimal number of entries.
At the OS level, the library first notifies the operating system that it wishes to receive notifications of DRAM failures, either in general or in specific areas of its virtual address space depending upon the interface provided by the operating system. Second, the library keeps track of the list of failable memory allocated by the application so that it can call the application callback for each failed allocation when necessary. Finally, the library handles any error notifications from the operating system (e.g., using a Linux SIGBUS signal handler) and performs OS-specific actions to clear a memory error from a page of memory if necessary prior to notifying the application of the error.
Implementation
We added support for handling signaled memory failures as described in the previous section to an existing incremental checkpointing library for Linux, libhashckpt [7] . We chose this library because it helps track application memory usage, and provides checkpointing functionality to recover from memory failures for applications that cannot. Its ability to trap specific memory accesses eases the testing of simulated memory failures, as described later in Section .
The modified version of the library adds the application API calls listed previously in Figure 1 , with the failable memory allocator using malloc() to allocate and free memory. This allocator also keeps a data structure sorted by allocation address of failable memory allocations.
Linux notifies the library of DRAM memory failures, particularly failures caught by the memory scrubber using a SIGBUS signal that indicates the address of the memory page which failed. The library then unmaps this failed page using munmap(), maps in a new physical page using mmap(), and calls the application-registered callback with appropriate offset and length arguments for every failable application allocation that overlapped with the page that included the failure.
Note that Linux currently only notifies the application of DRAM failures detected by the memory scrubber. When the memory controller raises an exception caused by the application attempting to consume faulty data, Linux currently kills the faulting application. In addition, Linux only notifies applications of the page that failed and expects the application to discard the entire failed page. This approach is overly restrictive in some cases, as the hardware notifies the kernel of the memory bus line that failed, and some memory errors are soft and could be corrected simply by rewriting the failed memory line.
Testing Support
To provide support for testing DRAM memory failures, we added support to the incremental checkpointing library for simulating memory failures. In particular, we added code that randomly injects errors at a configurable rate into the application address space and uses page protection mechanisms, i.e., mprotect(), to signal the application with a SIGSEGV when it touches a page to which a simulated failure has been injected. The library then catches SIGSEGV and proceeds as if it had received a memory failure on the protected page. We also implemented a simulated memory scrubber in the library which can asynchronously inject memory failures into the application by signaling the library when it scrubs a memory location at which a failure has been simulated.
Fault-Tolerant GMRES
We have used the interface described in Section to implement Fault-Tolerant GMRES (FT-GMRES), an iterative method for solving large sparse linear systems Ax = b. FT-GMRES computes the correct solution x even if the system experiences uncorrected faults in both data and arithmetic [9] . The algorithm will always either converge to the right answer, or (in rare cases) stop and report immediately to the caller if it cannot make progress. The algorithm accomplishes this by dividing its computations into reliable and unreliable phases. Rather than rolling back any faults that occur in unreliable phases, as a checkpoint / restart approach would do, FT-GMRES rolls forward and progresses through any faults in unreliable phases. FT-GMRES can also exploit fault detection, including but not limited to the ECC memory fault notification discussed above, in order to decide whether to accept the result of each unreliable phase.
FT-GMRES is based on the Flexible GMRES (FGMRES) algorithm of Saad [15] . FGM-RES extends the Generalized Minimal Residual (GMRES) method of Saad and Schultz [17] , by "flexibly" allowing the preconditioner (also called the "inner solve") to change in every iteration. The key observation behind FT-GMRES is that flexible iterations allow successive inner solves to differ arbitrarily, even unboundedly. This suggests modeling memory or arithmetic faults in the inner solves as "different preconditioners." Taking this suggestion results in FT-GMRES. The algorithm uses any existing solver to "precondition" an FGMRES-based outer iteration. Our experiments use as the existing solver an iterative method such as GM-RES with its own preconditioner, though it may be any algorithm (direct or iterative, dense or sparse or structured) that solves linear systems.
FT-GMRES expects that inner solves do most of the work, so inner solves run in the less expensive unreliable mode. The matrix A, right-hand side b, and any other inner solver data may change arbitrarily, and those changes need not even be transient. However, each outer iteration of FT-GMRES must run reliably, and requires a correct copy of the matrix A, right-hand side b, and additional outer solve data (the same that FGMRES would use). Since FT-GMRES expects only a small number of outer iterations, interspersed by longer-running inner solves, we need not store two copies (unreliable and reliable) of A and b in memory. Instead, we can save them to a reliable backing store, or even recompute them. With fault detection, we can avoid recovering or recomputing these data if no faults occurred, or even selectively recover or recompute just the corrupted parts of the critical data.
Initial Results
We have implemented FT-GMRES using components of the Trilinos solvers library [8] , in particular Tpetra sparse matrices and vectors, Belos iterative linear solvers (FGMRES for the outer iterations, and GMRES for the inner iterations), and Ifpack2 incomplete factorization preconditioners. Trilinos already provides a full hybrid-parallel (MPI + threads) implementation; we chose for simplicity to limit initial experiments to a single MPI pro- cess. We only needed to modify Trilinos to use the unreliable memory allocation interface described above. Our entire solver prototype uses only 2500 lines of C++ code. For experiments, we used the random fault injection feature of the incremental checkpointing library. Detection of faults works entirely independently of fault injection, so the same code would allow us to test actual hardware faults.
We tested FT-GMRES using the development (10.7) version of Trilinos, on a Intel Xeon X5570 (8 cores, 2.93 GHz) CPU with 12 GB of main memory. We chose for our test matrix an ill-conditioned Stokes partial differential equation discretization Szczerba/Ill Stokes from the University of Florida Sparse Matrix Collection (UFSMC) [4] . It has 25,187 rows and columns, 193,216 stored entries, and an estimated 1-norm condition number of 4.85×10
9 . For initial experiments, we chose a uniform [−1, 1] pseudorandom right-hand side.
We ran FT-GMRES with 10 outer iterations. Each inner solve used 50 iterations of standard GMRES (without restarting), right-preconditioned by ILUT (see e.g., Saad [16] ) with level 2 fill, zero drop tolerance, 1.5 relative threshold and 0.1 absolute threshold. (These are not necessarily reasonable ILUT parameters, but they ensure a valid preconditioner for the problem tested.) We compared FT-GMRES with standard GMRES both with and without restarting: 500 iterations of each, restarting if applicable every 50 iterations. (This makes the memory usage of the two methods approximately comparable.) We set no convergence criteria except for iteration counts, so that we could fully observe the behavior of the methods. Our initial experiments use random fault injection at a rate of 1000 faults per megabyte per hour, which is high but demonstrates the solver's fault-tolerance capabilities. Faults were allowed to occur in floating-point data belonging to the matrix and the ILUT preconditioner. Furthermore, to demonstrate the value of algorithmic approaches, our restarted GMRES implementation imitated FT-GMRES by also refreshing the matrix and ILUT preconditioner from reliable storage before every restart cycle. (We optimized by not refreshing if no memory faults were detected.) Figure 2 shows our convergence results. FT-GMRES' reliable outer iteration makes it able to roll forward through faults and continue convergence. The fault-detection capabilities discussed earlier in this work let FT-GMRES refresh unreliable data only when necessary, so that memory faults appear transient to the solver.
Related Work
There has been a wide range of research on application and OS techniques for recovering from faults in HPC systems. This includes both algorithmic work on allowing specific numeric codes to run failures, and OS-level work on handling memory faults both transparently and directing to the application. In the remainder of this section, we describe related work in both areas.
DRAM Error Handling
DRAM errors have been intensively studied in both HPC and other large computing systems recently. Recent research has characterized both the frequency of such errors in large scale systems [18] , as well as the low-level patterns with which they occur [13] .
OS-level handling of such faults has generally been either very limited or used very heavyweight solutions. Linux and other operating systems, for example, provide low-level techniques for handling, logging, and notifying the application of such errors [12] . These techniques generally terminate the application, potentially invoking higher-level recovery systems based on, for example, checkpointing or redundancy. Some systems have attempted to provide additional protection against memory faults both on CPUs [5] and GPUs [14] , though with substantial cost.
Fault Tolerant Algorithms
Most work in numerical linear algebra on fault tolerant algorithms falls in the category of algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) (see e.g., [11] ). ABFT encodes redundant data into the matrices and vectors themselves, such that data owned by failed parallel processors can be recomputed. Recent results using this technique show this method can be used with a very low performance overhead [3, 1] . Other authors have empirically investigated the behavior of iterative solvers when soft faults occur (e.g., [1, 10] ).
Inner-outer iterations with FGMRES have been used as a kind of iterative refinement in mixed-precision computation [2] , but as far as we know, this work is the first to use flexible iterative methods for reliability and robustness against possibly unbounded errors. Inexact Krylov methods generalize flexible methods by allowing both the preconditioner and the matrix to change in every iteration [19, 20] . However, inexact Krylov methods require error bounds, and thus cannot be used to provide tolerance against arbitrary data and computational faults when applying the matrix A.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we presented a cooperative cross-layer application / OS framework for recovering from DRAM memory errors. This framework allows the application to allocate failable memory and provides notification and callback mechanisms for failures that occur within these failable allocations. We described the fault and recovery model for this framework. Finally, we presented initial results of this framework using the new fault-tolerant linear solver FT-GMRES, and showed that the solver is able to converge in the presence of memory failures.
These initial results are promising, but more work is needed. Larger-scale studies are need to better characterize the cost of this framework at scale. Additionally, we are in the process of identifying more algorithms that can benefit from this DRAM failure framework.
